






Expertise is correctly, but one-sidedly, associated with special abilities and enhanced
performance. The other side of expertise, however, is surreptitiously hidden. Along
with expertise, performance may also be degraded, culminating in a lack of flexibility
and error. Expertise is demystified by explaining the brain functions and cognitive
architecture involved in being an expert. These information processing mechanisms,
the very making of expertise, entail computational trade-offs that sometimes result in
paradoxical functional degradation. For example, being an expert entails using schemas,
selective attention, chunking information, automaticity and more reliance on top-down
information, all of which allows experts to perform quickly and efficiently; however,
these very mechanisms restrict flexibility and control, may cause the experts to miss and
ignore important information, introduce tunnel vision and bias and can cause other
effects that degrade performance. Such phenomena are apparent in a wide range of expert
domains, from medical professionals and forensic examiners, to military fighter pilots
and financial traders.
Expertise is highly sought after – only those with special abilities, after years of training and
experience, can achieve those exceptional brain powers that make them experts. Indeed,
being an expert is most often prestigious, well-paid, respected and in high demand.
However, examining expertise in depth raises some interesting and complex questions. In
this chapter, I will take apart and reject the myth that experts merely have superior
performance per se. I will not only show that experts are not exclusively superior or
infallible, but that they are in fact sometimes prone to specific types of degradations and
errors.
Examining expertise from a cognitive neuroscientific perspective offers an opportunity
to understand that expertise is not about being faster and more efficient, but rather that
experts go about things differently. This leads to high performance in most cases, but not
always. Paradoxically, the very underpinning of expertise can entail degradation in per-
formance as well, such as tunnel vision and biases. These are inherent computational and
cognitive trade-offs resulting from the brain functions of experts. These trade-offs mean
that as you enhance performance in some aspects, you may decrease it in others. For
example, as experts modify their mental representations, they form very efficient brain
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177mechanisms, but these very mechanisms are inherently automatic and rigid, causing
vulnerabilities that may result in degradation and error (Sternberg, 2002; Stanovich, 2009).
To understand these mechanisms and their trade-offs, I start off with a discussion about
the world of experts and expertise. Then, I explore the brains and cognitive mechanisms of
experts, examining specific mental representations and architectures. Their paradoxical
nature will be highlighted by computational trade-offs, and their functional degradation
will be illustrated through expertise in real-world domains.
Recognizing and labelling an individual as an expert is to a large extent a social
construct, often based on education, certification and social acceptance. These are not
considered here, because the focus is on the actual expertise de facto. In other words, what
are the brain and cognitive makings of an expert, rather than the external social issues
involved (there may well be experts who are not socially recognized as experts, and –
conversely – there may be recognized ‘experts’ who in fact do not possess sufficient – or
any – expertise). Hence, I examine expertise from its actual brain and cognitive underpin-
ning, rather than addressing social notions of expertise. I am interested in the ontology of
what actually constitutes expertise, rather than the epistemological questions of how we
recognize and know who an expert is.
Even within the brain and cognitive literature, sometimes the notion of expertise has
been diluted and even dissolved by attributing it to everyone. For example, many research-
ers regard people as ‘experts’ in face recognition (e.g. Schwaninger et al., 2003; Carey, 1992;
Tanaka, 2001). Indeed, people have an excellent ability to recognize faces. However, since
everyone possesses this ability
1 (effortlessly and without needing specialized training), it
does not, in essence, constitute expertise in the way I conceptualize and address it.
Expertise is discussed and conceptualized in terms of expert performance, expertise in
the sense of special abilities that only some people possess, in contrast to others who are not
experts – the novices – who cannot perform to the levels of experts (e.g. Dror et al., 1993;
Wood, 1999). These abilities may entail different types of knowledge and performance
characteristics associated with different expertise. For example, declarative vs. procedural
knowledge (Squire, 1994; see ‘knowing that’ vs. ‘knowing how,’ Ryle, 1946, 1949). Declara-
tive knowledge, knowing that, is more factually based and may be more related to academic
and intellectual experts who understand certain things (but may not be able to ‘do’ anything
with it), whereas procedural knowledge, knowing how, is more related to performing an act,
where an expert knows how to do certain things (but may not understand much or anything
about it). For instance, an expert physicist knows the laws of physics, but may not know
how to ride a bicycle, drive a car or fly an airplane. In contrast, expert drivers and pilots will
know how to drive and race a car, or fly an aircraft, but may have no knowledge of the
physics underlying their expert performance. Indeed, trying to access declarative knowledge
can even interfere with expert performance that relies on procedural knowledge, e.g. expert
golfers (Flegal and Anderson, 2008).
The distinction between expertise being based on knowing that or on knowing how is
directly related to the real-world domains of expertise. For example, in the medical
domain some specialists may have expertise in diagnosis, knowing how to read, for
instance, X-rays; being able to know that a ‘tumour is present’, whereas other experts,
1 Except patients with developmental or acquired prosopagnosia, who have specific impairments
in recognizing faces.
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know how to remove the tumour. Some expert domains are clearly characterized more by
one type of knowledge, e.g. music, sports and other performing experts are based on
knowing how. Although experts may have both types of knowledge, often they need to
rely on one type of knowledge rather than the other (e.g. in policing, see Dror, 2007). The
type of expert knowledge that is most appropriate depends on the situational demands
and on the cognitive mechanisms involved in operationalizing this knowledge; e.g. time
constraints (e.g. Beilock et al., 2004; Dror, 2007).
Experts often have special ‘talent’; in other words, special and specific cognitive abilities
needed to perform tasks associated with their expert domain. Astronauts have mental
imagery abilities that are important for controlling a robotic arm during Space Shuttle
and International Space Station missions (Menchaca-Brandan et al., 2007). Cognitive ability
to inhibit an ongoing action in response to a signal from the environment is important for
expert baseball batting (Gray, 2009). Many specific cognitive abilities are important in the
medical domain, and specifically in surgery (e.g. Tansley et al., 2007). These examples of
baseball batting and surgical competence relate to expertise that are characterized by
knowing how, as they require, and extensively rely on, the ability to perform an action –
executing a motor command.
If cognitive abilities are important for such expertise, then domains that are much more
cognitively oriented, such as requiring visualization and pattern matching, are critically
dependent on cognitive abilities. Take, for example, the reliance on spatial visualization in
technical graphics and engineering design (Yue, 2007); the examination and comparison of
impression and pattern evidence in forensic domains (Dror and Cole, 2010); the visualiza-
tion of three-dimensional structures of molecules from two-dimensional representations in
chemistry (Pribyl and Bodner, 1987); or the visualization of body parts and their spatial
relations by clinical anatomists (Fernandez et al., 2011) and verbal and visuospatial abilities
of expert Scrabble players (Halpern and Wai, 2007).
Experts have abilities and capabilities that enable them to perform at much higher levels
than non-experts, the novices.
2 To achieve such performance levels, experts need to have
well-organized knowledge, use sophisticated and specific mental representations and cog-
nitive processing, apply automatic sequences quickly and efficiently, be able to deal with
large amounts of information, make sense of signals and patterns even when they are
obscured by noise, deal with low quality and quantity of data, or with ambiguous infor-
mation and many other challenging task demands and situations that otherwise paralyse the
performance of novices (e.g. Patel et al., 1999; Wood, 1999; Dror et al., 1993). Such expert
abilities and cognitive performance have been associated with specialized brains; for
example, in musicians (Gaser and Schlaug, 2003), radiologists (Harley et al., 2009), mathe-
maticians (Aydin et al., 2007), forensic examiners (Busey and Vanderkolk, 2005), taxi
drivers (Maguire et al., 2000) and even jugglers (Draganski et al., 2004).
Experts have abilities and knowledge that has been acquired by repeated exposure to
the tasks they need to perform. With time, they tune into and pick out the important and
relevant information, learning how to detect and use it well while ignoring and filtering
2 I conceptualize expertise as a continuum with different levels of performance abilities rather than
a dichotomy. Indeed, in some domains there is clear quantification of expert levels, such as chess
(e.g. Elo, 2008). In other domains which are not so well-defined, it is more difficult to clearly
quantify levels of expertise, but there is nevertheless a range of levels.
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Itiel E. Drorout everything else (e.g. Kundel and Nodine, 1983; Wood, 1999). Experts are driven by
knowledge contained in specific mental representations and schemas which they have
acquired by learning and experience (see Russell, 1910, for the distinction between
knowledge by description vs. knowledge by acquaintance). Armed with these expert tools,
they select and focus on the specific signals that are relevant, and perform quickly and
efficiently even in environments that contain little data or noise (e.g. Gold et al., 1999; Lu
and Dosher, 2004).
Training of experts can be improved and enhanced by helping them learn the important
and critical signals. For example, expertise in aircraft identification requires knowledge of
the distinguishing and distinctive features of each aircraft, and how to utilize them to
identify aircraft in a whole spectrum of orientations. Initially identification is difficult, if not
impossible. However, through repeated exposure to aircraft, experts learn the critical signals
that characterize each aircraft, and use these for identification. Dror et al. (2008) enhanced
the efficiency and effectiveness of acquiring this expertise by artificially exaggerating the
distinctive and unique features of each aircraft during training. The enhanced training not
only reduced the time needed to acquire this expertise, but it also produced more effective
mental representations that improved performance later during testing (see Dror et al.,
2008, for more details). With such knowledge, experts can deal with complex and difficult
tasks with relative ease, seemingly performing instantaneously and effortlessly.
Experts’ ability to perform with relative ease is surprising given the brain’s limited
capacity and resources to process information. However, this is exactly the point: experts
deal with cognitive load by mental representations and cognitive processes that are compu-
tationally efficient. This enables them to perform at high levels in the face of constraints
imposed by the brain. Certainly, one of the impediments on the performance of novices is
the brain’s limited capacity to process information. Experts overcome these constraints in a
number of ways that allow them to perform well; however, these solutions also entail a cost
– the associated degradation.
Experts often report that they ‘see things differently’. Indeed, a cornerstone of expertise
is that they modify how they represent information and the brain’s neuronal mechanisms
that process it. There are a few typical changes in knowledge organization with expertise,
which affect mental representations and processing. The common denominator of such
changes is that they re-package the information in ways that make it more efficient to
perform certain tasks. An everyday example of how people do such cognitive ‘re-packaging’
is when we ‘chunk’ information together. Chunking means that cognitive load is reduced by
lumping things together in mental representations that fit the task demands. For instance,
consider how people memorize and use phone numbers. They start off with singular digits,
but as they gain experience and use a number, they often ‘chunk’ some of the digits
together, re-packing the phone number (or area code) to a smaller number of units of
information. Using different mental representations to reduce cognitive load and increase
efficiency is a general cognitive and brain mechanism that is used when the available
resources are stretched; for example, older people may adopt more computationally effi-
cient mental representations (Dror et al., 2005).
With expertise, mental representations are formed to fit the specific task demands while
controlling for cognitive load. For example, Czerwinski et al. (1992) suggest ‘perceptual
unitization’, whereby conjunctions of features are chunked together so they are perceived as
a single entity. Unitization creates new entities and neural processing that causes compon-
ents that were once perceived separately to become fused together (Schyns and Rodet,
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Shiffrin and Lightfoot, 1997). However, the price of making such expertise-based unitiza-
tions is that the components are less available, if not inaccessible altogether (Fusi et al.,
2005; Kepecs et al., 2002).
The re-occurrence of typical configuration arrangements in expert domains results in
lumping them and jointly putting them together within a mental representation. Expert
chess players are a good illustration of this mechanism, exemplifying its advantages as well
as its functional degradation. Expert chess players do not represent board positions by
constituting individual pieces on the board; rather, they often chunk them together into
meaningful patterns. Indeed, expert chess players are much better than novices in encoding
and remembering board positions. However, the more efficient representations are con-
structed to fit certain situations and address specific task demands and experiences. That
means that these mechanisms of representing information are effective and efficient, but
only under certain conditions. The enhanced functional performance is limited; the chess
experts are indeed better than novices in encoding and remembering board positions, but
this is limited only to realistic board positions. Experts are no better, and are even worse
than novices, in board positions in which the constituting individual pieces are placed at
random (Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet and Simon, 1996). The reason for this is that the
experts’ mental representations are based on their experience with real games and real
board positions. Hence, their expert knowledge is helpful in those situations, but it does not
help, and it even hinders performance, when the knowledge is not applicable (as in random
board positions). The use of mental representations that capture configural arrangements
rather than single pieces is typical of experts across domains, from forensic fingerprint
experts to experts in the recognition of cars, dogs and birds (e.g. Busey and Vanderkolk,
2005; Gauthier et al., 2000; Tanaka and Curran, 2001; Rhodes and McLean, 1990).
The brain changes that occur with expertise reflect the optimization of the brain to carry
out the cognitive information processing needed for specific expert performance. As such,
the brain adapts, taking advantage of neuronal plasticity. However, as the brain develops to
accomplish specific expertise, there are a number of resulting limitations and even degrad-
ations that can occur. For example, professional London taxi drivers develop specific brains
that underpin their expertise, with greater grey matter volume in the posterior hippocampi
(Maguire et al., 2000, 2006). However, such changes in the brain are not mere improvement
and enhancement across the board. Along with greater grey matter volume in the posterior
hippocampi, Maguire et al. found less grey matter volume in the anterior hippocampi. The
accompanying behavioural performance levels showed that the London taxi drivers’ super-
ior knowledge of London landmarks and their spatial relationships came at a cost of
degraded performance in anterograde visuo-spatial memory (see Maguire et al., 2000,
2006). A further study showed that, although London taxi drivers were significantly more
knowledgeable about London landmarks and their spatial relationships, they were signifi-
cantly worse at forming and retaining new associations involving visual information
(Woollett and Maguire, 2009).
The same type of trade-offs are apparent in other expert domains. For example, while
detecting abnormalities in chest X-rays, expert radiologists show brain activity in the right
fusiform face area (FFA) that is correlated with visual expertise. However, it seems that this
comes at a price, as activity in left lateral occipital cortex correlated negatively with
expertise, and was reduced in experts compared to novices. Hence, achieving expert visual
performance may involve developing new neural representations while simultaneously
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explanation of some of these brain trade-offs has to do with narrow neural tuning that
may accompany specialization and expertise (e.g. Jiang et al., 2007).
Other brain changes reflect higher cognitive mental representations that characterize
expertise. For example, Busey and Vanderkolk (2005) studied expert fingerprint exam-
iners and observed brain activity that shows configural processing in fingerprint experts
(but not novices). At a higher level of information processing, cognition depends both
on bottom-up and top-down information. Bottom-up refers to the incoming data, where
as top-down relies on pre-existing knowledge. Top-down has many forms and manifest-
ations, which include the context in which the data is presented, past experience and
knowledge, expectations, etc. Experts rely more on top-down information, which allows
efficient and effective processing of the bottom-up data, but it can distort and bias how
the data are processed. For example, detectives and forensic experts may contaminate
and bias investigations because of such top-down processes (see Dror, 2008, 2009; Dror
and Cole, 2010).
Experts often consolidate and integrate complex sequences of steps into a unified
routine and schemata. By chunking steps together into a single entity or action, the experts
not only achieve quick performance in terms of execution time, but they are able to do more
because these processes are more computationally efficient. Such mental representations
and information processing many times give rise to automatization (Schneider and Shiffrin,
1977; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Experts rely on such processes especially in domains
that require complex decisions and actions under time pressure and risk. Automaticity is so
efficient that many times it does not require conscious initiation or control, and it may even
occur without awareness (Norman and Shallice, 1986).
Once the experts acquire the automated skills, they can perform them effortlessly.
However, the change in processes also degrades performance in a number of ways. Given
the nature of automaticity, experts cannot fully account and explain, or even recall, their
actions. This makes training difficult, as the expert knowledge is not accessible. It is further
problematic in expert domains, such as policing and medicine, where accountability is
expected and important. The lack of accessibility to knowledge in expert automaticity is so
engrained and inherent to the process that trying to access it can reduce performance
efficiency (e.g. Beilock et al., 2002; Flegal and Anderson, 2008).
Automaticity that often accompanies the development of expertise can also degrade
performance because it introduces different types of slips (Norman, 1981). An expert can
make a slip because an uncontrolled automated process has taken place rather than what
was actually needed, which may result in expert errors (Reason, 1979, 1990). The lack of
conscious awareness and monitoring, as well as lack of control, bring about rigidity and
minimize mindfulness (Langer, 1989). Expert performance many times requires flexibility
and creativity, but with automaticity it is reduced (if not eliminated altogether), resulting in
degradation of expert performance (e.g. Frensch and Sternberg, 1989).
Many times experts are required to act very quickly, without time to fully and logically
consider all options. These situations entail, at best, minimal flexibility and creativity
(whether it is needed or not), as they require very rapid responses (such as in the military,
police and medical settings). Actions in such situations rely on ‘experiential’ knowledge and
decision-making brain mechanisms, whereas other situations enable individuals to process
and consider information in a more ‘analytic’ fashion, utilizing different brain structures
and decision-making mechanisms (Dror, 2007; Johnson, 1988; Reyna, 2004; Sloman, 1996).
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problematic (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). These mainly develop on the job, through hands-
on experience.
As we have seen, many of the underpinnings of expertise involve ways of dealing with
cognitive load. They enable the experts to ‘do more for less’, that is, achieve higher levels of
performance with less cognitive effort, giving them enhanced cognition. Selective attention
is another way of achieving expert-level performance. In fact, one of the most important
characteristics of expertise is the ability to pay attention and focus on the important
information while filtering out and ignoring the rest (e.g. Wood, 1999). As one becomes
a greater expert, one becomes more selective, filtering out more and more information, at
an ever-increased rate. While a novice is still trying to absorb the information and make
sense of it, the expert has already focused on the critical information (e.g. de Valk and
Eijkman, 1984), processed it and solved the problem. Training of experts can focus on
enhancing the cognitive system’s ability to detect and pick up the important information.
Earlier in the chapter we described how enhancing unique aircraft features during training
increases acquiring expertise in aircraft recognition (Dror et al., 2008).
The process of attention and selection of information is critical. Experts must select the
‘right’ information, and they use their experience and expectations to guide this process. For
example, expert radiologists selectively process X-ray films according to clinically relevant
abnormalities (Myles-Worsley et al., 1988; de Valk and Eijkman, 1984). This results in
efficient and effective processing. However, the superior selective processing of the expert
radiologists is restricted to abnormalities, and was associated with degradation in their
ability to detect variations in normal features that did not contain abnormalities. Moreover,
selection processes are also highly vulnerable to biases and to other functional degradations.
What happens, for example, when experts filter out and ignore important information
because they regard it as irrelevant? Imagine a police detective gathering information in a
criminal investigation, guided by expectations that a certain suspect is guilty. If the
expectation or ‘hunch’ is correct, then information is effectively filtered out; however, if
they are incorrect, then important information is ignored (Dror, 2008; Rossmo, 2008). Such
confirmation bias is more likely to cause an expert to notice and focus on information that
validates and confirms their expectation, extraneous information, context, a belief or a
hope. These affect the way the expert allocates attention and examines information. The
result is possible degradation in performance, since confirming data are weighted highly
and emphasized, while conflicting data are weighted low (sometimes even filtered out and
ignored altogether).
Dror and Charlton (2006) and Dror et al. (2006) examined potential expert error in the
domain of forensic fingerprinting. In a couple of studies, expert fingerprint examiners were
presented with prints and were required to determine whether the prints matched.
Unknown to the experts, they were in fact presented with fingerprints they had judged in
the past, and the experimental set-up was designed to examine if performance would
degrade because of extraneous contextual cues. For example, fingerprints that were matched
as a definite identification by an examiner a few years ago were re-presented to the same
expert examiner as normal routine criminal case work. However, when the prints were
re-presented, they were presented within an extraneous context that suggested that they
were not a match (e.g. someone else confessed to the crime). Many of the expert examiners
contradicted their own past conclusions, exhibiting degradation in performance, and
resulting in erroneous conclusions as a result of the contextual influences (see Dror and
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are not limited to forensic examiners, e.g. see Potchen (2006) for inter-observer vari-
ability among radiologists, and Patel and Cohen (2008) for general medical errors in
critical care.
One of the main themes of this paper is to demystify expertise. Taking experts off the
high pedestal and examining expertise from a scientific viewpoint, showing that expertise is
not ‘all good’, and demonstrating the existence of paradoxical functional degradation with
expertise (e.g. Hecht and Proffitt, 1995). I have focused on cognitive and brain elements of
expertise, such as unitization, configural processing, automaticity and attention. However,
there are other psychological effects that can degrade the performance of experts. For
example, over-confidence, and sometimes even arrogance, can be an Achilles heel of
experts. As they become greater and greater experts, their confidence increases. This can
result in refusal to listen to others, take advice, pay attention to detail, etc. This is especially
problematic in expert domains that involve risk-taking and uncertainty. For example,
a doctor who is over-confident may not follow procedures in detail and take shortcuts;
a fighter pilot with over self-confidence may take inappropriate risks; and an over-confident
financial banker may make unbalanced and too high-risk investment decisions. Wishful
thinking, escalation of commitment, tunnel vision, belief perseverance, cognitive disson-
ance, group think, and other phenomena can also cause functional degradation with experts
(e.g. errors by expert referees of scientific journal articles, see Peters and Ceci, 1982;
Rothwell and Martyn, 2000).
To summarize, I have tried to illustrate the paradoxical nature of expertise, showing
that with extraordinary abilities come vulnerabilities and pitfalls (e.g. Dror et al., 1993;
Busey and Dror, 2009). These paradoxical elements represent inherent computational
trade-offs in brain and cognitive mechanisms that govern expertise, many of which are
unavoidable. The view that experts optimize performance overall is rejected, but rather
experts specialize and adapt their cognitive processing, optimizing to certain and specific
scenarios, but these changes do not always result in enhanced performance overall. Para-
doxically, in some cases they cause performance degradation (e.g. Hecht and Proffitt, 1995).
The paradoxical functional degradation of expertise is important to study and understand
as it gives a realistic picture of expertise, and also has implications on how to maximize
expert performance.
For enhancing expert performance, and minimizing the vulnerabilities that come with
it, one can use technology to support and overcome potential weaknesses. By ‘off-loading’
elements of expertise onto computers, one can extend the expert’s ability and distribute
cognition more appropriately (Dror and Harnad, 2008). However, throwing technology at
experts is by no means a solution – in fact, not only may it not help experts, it may even
degrade their performance. How best to use technology to help experts, how to optimize the
distribution of cognition and expert–technology collaboration, is a complex issue that has
to be carefully considered (Dror and Mnookin, 2010).
Expert performance depends mainly on two elements – the expert and their training.
Both elements pose interesting challenges for further research. In relation to the experts
themselves, critical factors include how to select the right people for domains in which they
can excel, how best to fit the person’s ability to the job requirements, and how to take
advantage of their cognitive profile and relate it to those cognitive abilities that are needed.
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Chapter 9: The paradox of human expertise: why experts get it wrongOnce you select the right person, then further research can guide the way to how best to
train them. The two issues, of selection and training, are related. Abilities that are relatively
hard-wired in the brain should be the focus of initial selection and screening, whereas those
abilities that can be acquired through neuronal plasticity and, thus, are more trainable
should be the focus of training (see Dror et al., 1993; Jiang et al., 2007; Munte et al., 2002;
Draganski et al., 2004).
The nature of expertise, its cognitive underpinning and its architecture have been discussed
and considered, and pose complex challenges which more research can further enlighten.
However, any future steps in improving expertperformance must be scientifically guided, with
an understanding of the vulnerabilities of experts (the enhanced performance along with the
potential pitfalls), and not through the naive view that experts are merely superior.
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